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Abstract—In this paper, the probability of Eve the Eavesdrop-
per’s correct decision is considered both in the Gaussian and
Rayleigh fading wiretap channels when using lattice codes for
the transmission.
First, it is proved that the secrecy function determining Eve’s
performance attains its maximum at y = 1 on all known extremal
even unimodular lattices. This is a special case of a conjecture
by Belfiore and Sole´. Further, a very simple method to verify or
disprove the conjecture on any given unimodular lattice is given.
Second, preliminary analysis on the behavior of Eve’s prob-
ability of correct decision in the fast fading wiretap channel
is provided. More specifically, we compute the truncated inverse
norm power sum factors in Eve’s probability expression. The anal-
ysis reveals a performance-secrecy-complexity tradeoff: relaxing
on the legitimate user’s performance can significantly increase
the security of transmission. The confusion experienced by the
eavesdropper may be further increased by using skewed lattices,
but at the cost of increased complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first part of the paper is related to the Gaussian wiretap
channel [1], [2], [3], [4]. Belfiore and Oggier defined in [4]
the secrecy gain
max
y∈R,0<y
ΘZn(yi)
ΘΛ(yi)
,
where
ΘΛ(z) =
∑
x∈Λ
epii||x||
2z,
as a new lattice invariant to measure how much confusion
the eavesdropper will experience while the lattice Λ is used
in Gaussian wiretap coding. The function ΞΛ(y) = ΘZn (yi)ΘΛ(yi) is
called the secrecy function. Belfiore and Sole´ then conjectured
in [3] that the secrecy function attains its maximum at y = 1,
which would then be the value of the secrecy gain. The secrecy
gain was further studied by Oggier, Sole´ and Belfiore in [2].
The main point of this part of the paper is to prove the
following theorem:
Theorem 1.1: The secrecy function obtains its maximum at
y = 1 on all known even unimodular extremal lattices.
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Further, the method used here applies for any given even
unimodular (and also for some unimodular but not even)
lattices. This will be discussed in its own section.
In the second part of the paper, we move from Gaussian
wiretap channels on to Rayleigh fading wiretap channels. Our
attempt is to increase the understanding of the performance of
wiretap lattice codes through a numerical analysis on the prob-
ability of Eve the Eavesdropper’s correct decision. To this end,
we provide the first explicit lattice code constructions based
on algebraic number fields K and the canonical embedding of
their rings of integersOK or an ideal I ⊆ OK , as suggested in
[5], and then compute the truncated inverse norm power sum
factors in Eve’s probability expression. The study concentrates
on the special case of totally real number field extensions
to guarantee full diversity [6], with three explicit example
codes arising from both orthogonal and skewed lattices that
are subsets in R4. The results indicate a performance-secrecy-
complexity tradeoff: relaxing on the legitimate user’s perfor-
mance can significantly increase the security of transmission.
The confusion experienced by the eavesdropper may be further
increased by using skewed lattices, but at the cost of increased
complexity.
We assume the fading is Rayleigh distributed. Due to lack
of space, we do not repeat the channel model nor the detailed
transmission scheme here, but refer to [5] for more details.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
Let us first recall the notion of a lattice as they will play a
key role throughout the paper. For our purposes, a lattice Λ is
a discrete abelian subgroup of a real vector space,
Λ = Zβ1 ⊕ Zβ2 · · · ⊕ ZβK ⊂ Rn,
where the elements β1, . . . , βK are linearly independent, i.e.,
form a lattice basis, and K ≤ n is called the rank of the
lattice. Here, we only consider full rank totally real lattices,
that is, we set K = n and will always have βi ∈ R.
The Gram matrix of a lattice is defined as G(Λ) =
(Tr(βiβ
T
j ))1≤i,j≤n = MM
T , where M is the generator
matrix of the lattice. The determinant of the Gram matrix is
also called lattice determinant. The volume of the fundamental
parallelotope of the lattice is Vol(Λ) =
√
det(G(Λ)) =
| det(M)|.
Definition 2.1: The minimum product distance of a lat-
tice Λ is dp,min(Λ) = min06=x∈Λ
∏n
i=1 |xi|, where x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Λ.
Remark 2.1: In order to fairly compare different lattices,
we first normalize them to a unit volume Vol(Λ) = 1 and
then compute the (normalized) minimum product distance
dp,min(Λ).
A lattice is called unimodular if its determinant = ±1, and
the norms are integral, i.e., ||x||2 ∈ Z for all vectors x in the
lattice. Further, it is called even, if ||x||2 is even. Otherwise
it is called odd. A lattice can be even unimodular only if the
dimension is divisible by 8. Odd unimodular lattices have no
such restrictions.
Definition 2.2: Write n = 24m + 8k, where k ∈
{0, 1, 2}.An even unimodular lattice is called extremal if the
norm of the shortest vector in the lattice is 2m+ 2.
It is worth noticing that the definition of extremal has
changed. Earlier (see e.g. [7]), extremal meant that the shortest
vector was of length
⌊
n
8
⌋
+ 1. With the earlier definition the
highest dimensional self-dual extremal lattice is in dimension
24 (see [7]), while with the current definition there is a selfdual
extremal lattice in dimension 80 (for a construction, see [8]).
III. ON THE CONJECTURE BY BELFIORE AND SOLE´ IN THE
GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL
Let us first have a closer look at theta-functions. For an
excellent source on theta-functions, see e.g. Chapter 10 in
Stein’s and Shakarchi’s book [9].
A. On theta functions
A theta function for a lattice Λ is defined as follows:∑
x∈Λ
e−pii||x||
2
.
In the following, we will need functions ϑ2, ϑ3 and ϑ4,
which are defined in the following way:
ϑ2(τ) = e
piiτ/4
∞∏
n=1
(1− q2n)(1 + q2n)(1 + q2n−2)
ϑ3(τ) =
∞∏
n=1
(1− q2n)(1 + q2n−1)2
ϑ4(τ) =
∞∏
n=1
(1− q2n)(1− q2n−1)2.
Let us now have a brief look at the even unimodular lattices.
Write again n = 24m + 8k. Then the theta function of
the lattice can be written as a polynomial of the Eisenstein
series E4 and the discriminant function ∆: Θ = E3m+k4 +∑m
j=1 biE
3(m−j)+k∆j . Since E4 = 12
(
ϑ82 + ϑ
8
3 + ϑ
8
4
)
and
∆ = 1256ϑ
8
2ϑ
8
3ϑ
8
4, the theta function of an even unimodular
lattice can be easily written as a polynomial of these basic
theta functions. Furthermore, since ϑ42+ϑ44 = ϑ43, the secrecy
function can be written as a simple rational function of ϑ
4
2ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
:
ΘZn
ΘΛ
=
ϑn3
E3m+k4 +
∑m
j=1E
3(m−j)+k
4 ∆
j
=
((
1− ϑ
4
2ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
)3m+k
+
m∑
j=1
bj
256j
(
1− ϑ
4
2ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
)3(m−j)+k
·
(
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
)2j
−1
. (1)
Hence, finding the maximum of the secrecy function is equiva-
lent to finding the minimum of the denominator of the previous
expression in the range of ϑ
4
2ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
.
Let us now turn to general unimodular lattices, in particular
odd ones. Write now n = 8µ+ ν, where n is the dimension
of the lattice. Just like a bit earlier, the theta function of any
unimodular lattice (regardless of whether it’s even or odd), can
be written as a polynomial (see e.g. (3) in [7]):
ΘΛ =
µ∑
r=0
arϑ
n−8r
3 ∆
r
8,
where ∆8 = 116ϑ
4
2ϑ
4
4. Hence
ΘZn
ΘΛ
=
(
µ∑
r=0
ar
16r
ϑ4r2 ϑ
4r
4
ϑ8r3
)−1
. (2)
Again, to determine the maximum of the function, it suffices
to consider the denominator polynomial in the range of ϑ2ϑ4ϑ3 .
B. Lemmas
The following lemma is easy, and follows from the basic
properties of theta functions. The proof will be omitted.
Lemma 3.1: Let y ∈ R. The function f(y) = ϑ44(yi)ϑ42(yi)
ϑ83(yi)
has symmetry: f(y) = f (1/y).
We may now formulate a lemma that is crucial in the proof
of the main theorem:
Lemma 3.2: Let y ∈ R. The function ϑ44(yi)ϑ42(yi)
ϑ83(yi)
attains its
maximum when y = 1. This maximum is 14 .
Proof: To shorten the notation, write g = e−piy. Notice
that when y increases, g decreases and vice versa. Using the
product representations for the functions ϑ2(yi), ϑ3(yi) and
ϑ4(yi), we obtain
ϑ2(yi)ϑ4(yi)
ϑ3(yi)2
= g1/4
( ∞∏
n=1
(1 + g2n)(1 + g2n−2)
)
×
( ∞∏
n=1
(1− g2n−1)2
)( ∞∏
n=1
(1 + g2n−1)−4
)
.
Now ∞∏
n=1
(1 + g2n−2) = 2
∞∏
n=1
(1 + g2n)
and
∞∏
n=1
(1 + g2n−1)−4 =
∞∏
n=1
(1 + (−g)n)4
=
( ∞∏
n=1
(1 + g2n)
)4( ∞∏
n=1
(1− g2n−1)
)4
.
Combining all these pieces together, we obtain
ϑ2(yi)ϑ4(yi)
ϑ3(yi)2
= 2
(
g1/24
∞∏
n=1
(1 + (−g)n)
)6
.
Since the factor 2 is just a constant, it suffices to consider the
function g1/24
∏∞
n=1(1 + (−g)n). To find the maximum, let
us first differentiate the function:
∂
∂g
(
g1/24
∞∏
n=1
(1 + (−g)n)
)
=
(
g1/24
∞∏
n=1
(1 + (−g)n)
)(
1
24g
+
∞∑
n=1
n(−1)ngn−1
1 + (−g)n
)
.
Since g1/24
∏∞
n=1(1+(−g)n) is always positive, it suffices to
analyze the part 124g+
∑∞
n=1
n(−1)ng(n−1)
1+(−g)n to find the maxima.
We wish to prove that the derivate has only one zero, because
if it has only one zero, then this zero has to be located at y = 1
(because the original function has symmetry, and therefore, a
zero in the point y results in a zero in the point 1y which has to
be separate unless y = 1). To show that the derivative has only
one zero, let us consider the second derivative, or actually, the
derivative of the part 124g +
∑∞
n=1
n(−1)ngn−1
1+(−g)n . Now
∂
∂g
(
1
24g
+
∞∑
n=1
n(−1)ngn−1
1 + (−g)n
)
= − 1
24g2
+
∞∑
n=1
(
n(n− 1)(−1)ngn−2
1 + (−g)n −
n2g2(n−1)
(1 + (−g)n)2
)
.
Now we wish to show that this is negative when g ∈ (0, 1).
Let us first look at the term − 124g2 and the terms in the sum
corresponding the values n = 1 and n = 2. Their sum is
− 1
24g2
− 1
(1− g)2 +
2− 2g2
(1 + g2)2
=
−73g6 + 98g5 − 51g4 − 92g3 + 21g2 + 2g − 1
24g2(1− g)2(1 + g2)2 .
The denominator is positive when g ∈ (0, 1), and the nomina-
tor has two real roots, which are both negative (approximately
g1 ≈ −0.719566 and g2 ≈ −0.196021). On positive values
of g, the nominator is always negative. In particular, the
nominator is negative when g ∈ (0, 1).
Let us now consider the terms n > 2, and show that the sum
is negative. Since the original function has symmetry y → 1y ,
and we are only considering the real values of the theta series,
we may now limit ourselves to the interval y ∈ [1,∞), which
means that g ∈ (0, e−pi]. Let us now show that the sum of
two consecutive terms where the first one corresponds an odd
value of n, and the second one an even value of n is negative.
The sum looks like the following:
−n(n− 1)g
n−2
1− gn −
n2g2(n−1)
(1− gn)2 +
n(n+ 1)gn−1
1 + gn+1
− (n+ 1)
2g2n
(1 + gn+1)2
.
Let us estimate this, and take a common factor:
< gn−2n
(
− n− 1
1− gn −
ngn
(1− gn)2
+
(n+ 1)g
1 + gn+1
− (n+ 1)g
n+2
(1 + gn+1)2
)
= gn−2n
(
−n− 1 + g
n
(1 − gn)2 +
(n+ 1)g
(1 + gn+1)2
)
< gn−2n
(−(n− 1)− gn + (n+ 1)g
(1 + gn+1)2
)
< 0,
when (n− 1)+ gn > (n+1)g. Since (n− 1)+ gn > (n− 1),
and (n+1)g ≤ (n+1)e−pi < n+110 < n− 1, when n ≥ 2, this
proves that the first derivative has only one zero. This zero
is at y = 1. Since the second derivative is negative, it means
that this point is actually the maximum of the function. The
maximum value is ϑ
4
2(i)ϑ
4
4(i)
ϑ83(i)
= 14 .
C. Proof of the main theorem
Let us first deal with the lattice E8 as a warm-up case. We
wish to show that
Theorem 3.3: ΞE8(y) ≤ ΞE8(1).
Proof: Notice that
ΞE8(y) =
(
1
2
(
ϑ2(yi)
8 + ϑ3(yi)
8 + ϑ4(yi)
8
ϑ3(yi)8
))−1
=
(
1− ϑ
4
2(yi)ϑ
4
4(yi)
ϑ83(yi)
)−1
,
Therefore, to show that Theorem 3.3 holds, it suffices to
show that ϑ2(yi)
4ϑ4(yi)
4
ϑ3(yi)8
≤ ϑ2(i)4ϑ4(i)4ϑ3(i)8 , which is equivalent to
showing that ϑ2(yi)ϑ4(yi)ϑ3(yi)2 ≤
ϑ2(i)ϑ4(i)
ϑ3(i)2
, which we have already
done in Lemma 3.2.
Let us now concentrate on the other cases. Again, write
z =
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
. The following table gives the secrecy functions
of all known extremal even unimodular lattices (notice that
these are known only in dimensions 8− 80):
dimension Ξ
8 (1 − z)−1
16
(
(1 − z)2
)
−1
24
(
(1 − z)3 − 45
16
z2
)
−1
32
(
(1 − z)4 − 15
4
(1 − z)z2
)
−1
40
(
(1 − z)5 − 75
16
(1 − z)2z2
)
−1
48
(
(1 − z)6 − 45
8
(1 − z)3z2 + 3915
2048
z4
)
−1
56
(
(1 − z)7 − 105
16
(1 − z)4z2 + 21735
4096
(1 − z)z4
)
−1
64
(
(1 − z)8 − 15
2
(1 − z)5z2 + 4905
512
(1 − z)2z4
)
−1
72
(
(1 − z)9 − 135
16
(1 − z)6z2 + 60345
4096
(1 − z)3z4 − 53325
32768
z6
)
−1
80
(
(1 − z)10 − 75
8
(1 − z)7z2 + 42525
2048
(1 − z)4z4 − 202125
32768
(1 − z)z6
)
−1
It suffices to show that the first derivatives of the denominators
are negative because then the denominator is decreasing, and
the function is increasing and obtains its maximum at z = 14 .
It is a straightforward calculation to show this. For some
details, see [10].
D. Method for any given unimodular lattice
Let Λ be a unimodular lattice. Then its secrecy function
can be written as a polynomial P (z), where z = ϑ
4
2ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
as
shown in (1) and (2). Now, according to Lemma 3.2, 0 ≤
z ≤ 14 (the lower bound does not follow from the lemma but
from the fact that z is a square of a real number). Therefore,
it suffices to consider the polynomial P (z) on the interval
[0, 14 ]. The conjecture is true if and only if the polynomial
obtains its smallest value on the interval at 14 . Investigating the
behaviour of a given polynomial to show whether one point
is its minimum on a short interval is a very straightforward
operation.
IV. ON THE SIZE OF EVE’S INVERSE NORM POWER SUM IN
A FAST RAYLEIGH FADING WIRETAP CHANNEL
Let us now look at the Rayleigh fading wiretap channel and
analyze the behavior of the probability for Eve’s correct deci-
sion in some example cases. This will give us a preliminary
understanding as to what are the key properties affecting the
secrecy gained by lattice coding.
A. The probability expression and the inverse norm power sum
We start by recalling the expression Pc,e for the probability
of a correct decision for Eve, when observing a lattice Λe. For
the fast fading case [5, Sec.III-A],
Pc,e ≃
(
1
4γ2e
)n/2
Vol(Λb)
∑
06=x∈Λe
n∏
i=1
1
|xi|3 , (3)
where γe is the average SNR for Eve assumed sufficiently
large so that Eve can perfectly decode Λe. Here Λb denotes
the lattice intended for Bob, and Λe ⊂ Λb. It can be concluded
from (3) that the smaller the sum ∑06=x∈Λe ∏ni=1 1|xi|3 , the
more confusion Eve is experiencing.
As a construction method, the authors of [5] propose to
use the canonical embedding of the ring of integers OK (or
a suitable proper ideal I ⊂ OK) of a number field K over
Q. The field K is chosen totally real to achieve full diversity.
More precisely, if x ∈ OK , the transmitted lattice vector in
the fast fading case would be
x = (σ1(x), σ2(x), . . . , σn(x)) ∈ OnK = Λe, (4)
where σi are the (now all real) embeddings of K into C. The
corresponding probability for Eve’s correct decision (3) yields
the following inverse norm power sum to be minimized [5,
Sec.III-B]:
SM =
∑
x∈OK
1
|NK/Q(x)|3
, (5)
where M denotes the generator matrix of the lattice Λe.
Remark 4.1: The infinite sums above do not necessarily
converge. In practice, however, the sum will always be trun-
cated as x ∈ C ( Λe, where the code C is finite.
B. Example constructions and analysis on the sum SM
In this section, we describe three alternative constructions
for the fast fading channel built from different number fields
and their ideals. Optimal and nearly optimal unitary lattice
generator matrices in terms of the minimum product distance
(cf. Def. 2.1) are provided in [11]. We will analyze the ones
with degree n = 4, denoted here by Λ1 and Λ2, with the
respective unitary (i.e., MMT = I4) generator matrices M1
([11, optimal, M1 = krus 4 ]) and M2 ([11, suboptimal,
M2 = mixed 2x2]). The first construction is based on the
Kronecker product of the lattice generator matrices corre-
sponding to the canonical embeddings of the rotated Z2 lattices
α1Z[
√
2] and α2Z[θ], where θ = 1+
√
5
2 , α1 =
1
2
√
2+4
and
α2 = 3 − θ. The second construction corresponds to the
canonical embedding of OQ(δ), where δ4−δ3−3δ2+δ+1 = 0.
Both lattices are rotated versions of Z4 with full diversity and
good minimum product distances, dp,min(Λ1) = 1√52·29 ≈
0.037139... and dp,min(Λ1) = 140 ≈ 0.025. We use finite
constellations Sm constructed by taking a square box with a
zero mean within the lattice, i.e.,
x ∈ Sm =
{
n∑
i=1
zixi
∣∣∣∣m ≥ zi ∈ Z
}
⊂ Λe.
Let us now compare these two (finite) orthogonal constructions
by computing truncated sums
SM (Plim,m) =
∑
06=x∈Λe∩Sm,||x||2E≤Plim
1
|NK/Q(x)|3
(6)
for a given power limit Plim and for a given finite con-
stellation Sm. In the above sum, x = (x1, . . . , xn) =
(σ1(x), σ2(x), . . . , σn(x)), where x ∈ OK or x ∈ I ⊂ OK .
For a fair comparison, the lattices are normalized to unit
energy, i.e., to have Vol(Λe) = 1. The volumes of the corre-
sponding superlattices Λb of Bob will then scale accordingly.
In Table I we have listed the inverse norm power sums for
fixed constellations without limiting the energy, that is, the
codebook will be of size |Cort| = (2m+ 1)4. The maximum
energies Pmax used by the constellations are also provided.
From Table I we can make the following important conclu-
sion. In terms of the pair-wise error probability (PEP) for Bob
as the intended legitimate receiver, the optimal lattice is known
to provide (at least asymptotically) the best performance.
However, from the secrecy point of view the suboptimal lattice
may provide significantly improved secrecy by causing more
confusion to the eavesdropper Eve. This is due to a secondary
code design criterion related to maximizing the norms of the
code vectors (usually showing its PEP effect at the low SNR
regime), which obviously plays an important role also in the
wiretap scenario (cf. (5)).
Next, we extend our analysis by computing the inverse norm
power sums for a skewed lattice, denoted by Λ3, corresponding
to the maximal real subfield of the 15th cyclotomic field. The
generator matrix is denoted by M3. The minimum product
distance of this lattice is dp,min(Λ3) = 1√1125 ≈ 0.02981...
putting it in between the lattices Λ1 and Λ2 in terms of
dp,min(Λ). From Table II, we can conclude that skewed
lattices may significantly increase the secrecy compared to
orthogonal lattices. One has to notice, however, that this
bares the price of increased complexity as we need to carve
spherical codebooks by using a bigger alphabet in order to
get the possible benefits. More precisely, we only choose the
codewords in the set {x ∈ Λe ∩ Sm | ||x||2E ≤ Plim}. Hence,
in order to achieve the same size of a codebook that we would
have without an energy limit, we may need to increase m (see
e.g. the boldface lines in Table II). The bigger the m, the closer
we get to a spherical constellation with a given energy limit.
TABLE I
VALUES OF SM (Plim = ∞,m) FOR ORTHOGONAL LATTICES WITHOUT
AN ADDITIONAL ENERGY LIMIT AND WITH A CODEBOOK SIZE
|Cort| = (2m+ 1)4 .
m Pmax Pave SM1(Plim, m) SM2 (Plim,m)
1 4 2.67 9.12264 · 107 2.83706 · 106
2 16 8.00 2.24565 · 1010 6.46037 · 106
3 36 16.00 2.49382 · 1011 1.16395 · 107
4 64 26.67 2.49829 · 1011 1.52838 · 107
5 100 40.00 2.49851 · 1011 1.99487 · 107
6 144 56.00 2.50437 · 1011 2.38188 · 107
7 196 74.67 2.61395 · 1011 2.69652 · 107
8 256 96.00 2.61736 · 1011 3.00791 · 107
9 324 120.00 2.61739 · 1011 3.42272 · 107
10 400 146.67 2.71764 · 1011 3.68287 · 107
TABLE II
VALUES OF SM (Plim, m) FOR A SKEWED LATTICE WITH BOUNDED
ENERGY.
m Plim Pmax Pave |Csph| |Cort| SM3 (Plim,m)
8 4 3.63 2.66 79 81 1.89195 · 106
5 16 15.71 9.18 555 625 4.24298 · 106
6 16 15.71 9.56 715 625 4.77423 · 106
7 36 35.57 20.33 2405 2401 7.13024 · 106
12 36 24.00 15.24 2401 2401 2.29374 · 106
9 64 63.89 35.67 6929 6561 9.93903 · 106
10 100 99.97 55.72 13663 14641 1.20680 · 107
11 100 99.97 55.57 16053 14641 1.29038 · 107
14 196 195.98 106.63 50975 50625 1.29038 · 107
18 324 323.93 175.95 137273 130321 2.18703 · 107
20 400 399.90 217.31 208411 194481 2.40716 · 107
Note that we have normalized the lattices to a unit volume
(corresponding to a unit minimum energy in the orthogonal
case), whereas to compare the full probability expressions (3)
we should normalize the SNR term rather with respect to
a unit average energy. For comparison purposes, this makes
no difference for orthogonal lattices as the average energies
are directly determined by the signaling alphabet and not
affected by the generator matrices, so the scaling factors will
coincide. However, in the case of skewed lattices the situation
is different, and the average energy has an input coming
from the generator matrix in addition to the alphabet. This
may loosen our conclusion related to skewed lattices to some
extend. Due to lack of time, we studied this effect here only for
the case of maximum energy/energy limit 36 (see the boldface
lines in Table I and Table II). We can see that the skewed lattice
can achieve even better energy distribution than the orthogonal
ones, when m is chosen sufficiently large. Unfortunately, the
bigger the m, the higher the complexity. Further analysis is
clearly required and planned to be carried out by the final
submission of this paper. Due to lack of space, we were also
forced to omit the corresponding analysis on the block fading
channel. This will be reported in near future.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed the probability of Eve the Eavesdropper’s
correct decision in a wiretap channel. In the case of a Gaussian
wiretap channel, we proved the Belfiore-Sole´ conjecture for
all known even unimodular extremal lattices, and gave a
method to prove or disprove it on any given unimodular
lattice. In the case of a Rayleigh fading wiretap channel,
we computed truncated values of the inverse norm power
sum and compared three different lattices. The comparison
resulted in an interesting conclusion: slightly relaxing on Bob’s
optimal performance can significantly increase the secrecy of
the transmission. Further reliability can be achieved by using a
skewed lattice, but at the cost of increased complexity. Hence,
there is clearly a performance-secrecy-complexity tradeoff
aiding the service provider’s subjective choice for a suitable
transmission scheme.
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